Moral economy: Rethinking a radical concept by Palomera, Jaime & Vetta, Theodora
Moral  economy: Rethinking a radical concept
Jaime Palomera1
Universitat de Barcelona, Spain
Theodora Vetta
Universitat de Barcelona, Spain
Abstract
This article argues that the original thrust of the moral economy
concept has been understated and attempts to cast it in a new light
by bringing class and capital back into the equation. First, it reviews
the seminal works of Thompson and Scott, tracing the origins of
the term. It deals with the common conflation of moral economy
with Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness, differentiating the two
concepts and scrutinizing the ways in which these perspectives
have been criticized. Second, it dispels dichotomist conceptions
separating economic practice from morality, or embedded
configurations from disembedded ones. Against binary views of
the market as a boundless realm penetrating previously untainted
moral spheres, it posits that social reproduction is characterized by
an entanglement of values, which can only be fully grasped by
delineating the contours and characteristics   of   capital
accumulation.   Third,  it   contends that moral economy is a
dynamic concept because it accounts for class-informed
frameworks involving traditions, valuations and expectations.
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Finally, it argues that moral economy can enrich the concept of
hegemony because it pays attention to the often-contradictory
values that guide and sustain livelihood practices, through which
cultural domination is reproduced or altered.
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Introduction 1
In the last two decades the moral economy concept has
reemerged with strength. However, as often occurs with catchy
categories, scholars have approached it in contradictory ways.
Among its di erentff  uses, two main strands stand out. On the one
hand, moral economy has been used to scrutinize systems of
provisioning that seem to emerge ‘outside’ or ‘in the cracks of’ the
market. ‘Solidarity’, ‘alternative’ or ‘informal’ practices usually
constitute the target. In these analyses, moral econ- omy is
synonymous with an organized field of values, where economic
practice appears ‘embedded’ in moral obligations and social
norms (Olivier de Sardan, 1999; Tripp, 2006; Orlando, 2010;
Langegger, 2015). As Hann has noted in a recent reappraisal
(2010), the central characteristic of this approach is that by
highlighting values and norms, it challenges economistic views.
On the other hand, the growing interest in systems of values and
norms per se has increasingly led scholars to drop the production
and distribution of resources from the picture. In his 2009 article
‘Les économies morales revisitées’, Fassin critically   discussed
some of these instances, saluting their conceptual departure
from   Thompson’s original rumination (1971) and warning about
the risk of culturalization and depoliticization. Fassin’s own work is
paradigmatic of this second trend, where semantic weight has
shifted from the noun (economy) to the adjective (moral). As he
admits, his interest lies less with moral economies than with the
economy of morals, that is, ‘the production, distribution, circulation
and use of moral feelings, emotions and values, norms and
obligations in the social   space’ (Fassin, 2009: 1257, our own
translation). In other words, the economy  in capital letters has
ceased to be the object of analysis, leaving the spotlight  on the
study of morals (Daston, 1995; Fassin, 2009). As a result, moral
economy has quickly become a strange guest in the bourgeoning
field of ‘moral anthropology’ (Zigon, 2007; Fassin, 2012).
Though both kinds of literature o erff  tremendously relevant
insights, the problem is that the original thrust of the concept has
been understated, to the point of obscuring social relations rather
than explaining them. As advised by Thompson (1991) and
recalled by Edelman (2005, 2012), if simply equated with ‘values’
and emptied of class content, moral economy loses its raison
d’être: anything can be deemed a moral economy. In this article
we want to reclaim the radical foundations of the term by bringing
capital and class back into the equation. This ‘return to the roots’
will hopefully not be read as an empty programmatic slogan, but
as a theoretical operation that casts light on moral economy both
as a concept and an approach.
First, conceptually speaking, we build on some of the insights
that Narotzky developed in a recent article (2015). We contend
that the structural inequalities generated by particular forms of
capital accumulation – mediated by particular kinds of state
regulation – are always metabolized through particular fields con-
stituted by dynamic combinations of norms, meanings and
practices. It is these fields that we call moral economies. They can
reproduce or strengthen patterns of  capital accumulation that
regulate social structure, but they can also alter and even short-
circuit them. As will be gleaned from our analysis below, the
original moral economists point at nothing other than a historical
shift from a particular moral economy of capitalism to a new moral
economy. Following this line of thought, our article runs counter to
a sort of common sense that restricts the concept to a particular
social actor probably deriving from the fact that Thompson himself
originally talked about the moral economy ‘of the English crowd’.
We instead argue that analytical mileage can be gained by
using it in relation to broad social fields of thought and action,
which involve di erenceff  and antagonism, and contribute
decisively to shaping the field of provisioning and social
reproduction. Thus, we can for instance speak of the moral
economy of European integration (Gkintidis, this issue), or the
moral economy of flexible production (Kofti, this issue) and the
di erentff  values, meanings and practices that arise around them,
attached to di erentlyff  positioned actors, and always linked to
disparate class experiences.
Second, we assert that moral economy is simultaneously an
approach that inte- grates the traditional objects of political
economy (relations between capital, class and state) but goes
further by anthropologically scrutinizing the particular ways in which
they are always embedded. In other words, the moral economic
approach has a double ‘mission’: on the one hand, it advocates a
grounded understanding of the more abstract and global political-
economy processes; on the other, it histori- cizes the everyday
realm of observation by accounting for class-informed dispos- itions
in a particular time and space. Moral economy is particularly well
suited to analyze the political culture, norms and expectations of
the various groups of  people involved in social reproduction,
broadly speaking; the power relations between the governed and
the elites; and the articulation of such dispositions and relations
with capitalist processes of continuity and change. The strength of
this perspective lies in its capacity to highlight the ambiguous logics
and values that guide and sustain livelihood practices, by looking at
the dynamic fields of struggle around the boundaries of what is
good and acceptable, their power hierarchies and the political
projects they might inform.
The article is structured in four parts. First, it reviews the
seminal works of Thompson and Scott, tracing the origins of the
concept. It deals with the common conflation of moral economy
with Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness, and the ways in which this
perspective has been criticized. Second, it dispels dichotomist con-
ceptions separating economic practice from morality, or embedded
configurations from disembedded ones. Against binary views of the
market as a boundless realm penetrating previously untainted moral
spheres, it posits that social reproduction  is characterized by an
entanglement of values, which can only be fully grasped by
delineating the contours and characteristics of capital
accumulation. Third, it contends that moral economy is a dynamic
concept because it accounts for class- informed frameworks
involving traditions, valuations and expectations. This, in fact, is the
key element that di erentiatesff  it from the embeddedness thesis.
Finally, it argues that moral economy can enrich the notion of
hegemony because it pays attention to the often-contradictory
values that guide and sustain livelihood prac- tices, through which
cultural domination is reproduced and altered.
The origins of moral economy and its discontents
The concept of moral economy was popularized by the seminal
work of E.P. Thompson. In his 1971 essay ‘The Moral Economy of
the English Crowd’, the historian focuses on the food riots in 18th-
century England, in an attempt to reveal the historical agency of ‘the
crowd’ and to argue against ‘spasmodic views of popular history’
that naturalize and reduce people’s actions to automatic quasi-
biological responses to hunger. The brilliance of his work consists
not only in that it unpacks the complex motivations and choices
behind this particular pattern of collective action, but also in that it
takes them as a window onto a wider socio-economic process:
namely, the long transition from a system of provision framed by
paternalist institutions to an emerging political economy regulated by
so-called free market policies, which benefited particular sectors of
the bourgeoisie. These changes were well under way from the mid-
1700s on, accompanying the gradual repeal of protective legislation.
Yet as Thompson describes, in times of dearth, a particular
consensus emerged between, on the one hand, town laborers and
crafts- men and, on the other hand, local magistrates and the gentry.
This was based on a widely shared mentalite´ about emergency
market-regulation in  favor of the unprivileged and the poor. When
di erentff  groups (tinners, carpenters, weavers and col- liers) chose
to attack a series of social targets (mills, farmers withholding corn
and suspicious middlemen) they did it with the purpose of, first,
punishing immoral profit-seekers (rather than stealing to satisfy their
hunger) and second, fixing prices.
Their actions, as Thompson stresses, were informed by a popular
consensus as to what were legitimate and what were illegitimate
practices in marketing, milling, baking, etc. This in its turn was
grounded upon a consistent traditional  view of  social norms and
obligations, of  the  proper economic  functions of several parties
within the community, which, taken together, can be said to
constitute the moral economy of the poor. An outrage to these moral
assumptions, quite as much as actual deprivation, was the usual
occasion for direct action. (1971: 79)
As he concludes,  the point here is not just that prices, in time of
scarcity, were determined by many other factors than mere market-
forces: anyone with even a scanty knowledge of much- maligned
‘literary’ sources must be aware of that. It is more important to note
the total socioeconomic context within which the market operated,
and the logic of crowd pressure. (1971: 125)
The other key author who contributed to popularizing the moral
economy concept is James Scott. Although he barely refers to
Thompson in his original work (beyond fleeting references), the
notion is deployed to analyze peasant households in 20th-century
Burma and Vietnam (1976). Starting from the micro setting of
everyday life, he also reveals their livelihoods’ entanglement with larger
transformations, namely colonial state formation and free-market
expansion. Crucially, the focus is not so much on the acts and
exact causes of peasant rebellion (which Moore or Wolf had
tackled in 1966 and 1969, respectively) than on their very
conditions of possibility. It is about ‘the nature of exploitation in
peasant society as its victims are likely to see it, and what one
might call the creation of social dynamite rather than its detonation’
(1976: 4). Scott speaks of ‘the moral economy of the subsistence
ethic’. Against the maximizing homo oeconomicus of neoclassical
economics – or ‘the would-be Schumpeterian entrepreneur’ (1976:
4) – peasants are framed as risk-averse social agents, having as
their guiding value a ‘safety-first principle’. This very quest to
guarantee a minimum level of subsistence informs their ‘notion of
economic justice and their working definition of exploitation – their
view of which claims on their product were tolerable and which
intolerable’ (1976: 3). Thus, Scott sees peasant mobilizations not as
a direct outcome of absolute surplus extraction, but as a violation
(backed by the colonial state) of a social pattern of moral
entitlements and expectations that used to define unequal    yet
tolerated power relations both among peasants within the village
and with outside elites and patrons (1976: 6).
With their contributions, Thompson and Scott laid the groundwork
for a potentially very rich field of analysis. Moral economy seemed
particularly well suited to illuminate broad processes of continuity
and change by looking at the ways in which laboring people
understand and become involved in actions in the market (their
political culture, dispositions, traditions, etc.) and their changing
social alli- ances with economic elites and the state. In other words,
the original moral economists put forth the theoretical foundations
for thinking about social reproduction at  large, while  keeping  a
grounded perspective – particularly in contexts where market forces
and the logics of capital accumulation are becoming dominant.
However, much of the recent literature engaging with the notion of
moral economy and actually dealing with economic practice has
generally not followed along in the footsteps of its founders. First,
there is a common tendency to constrain the notion of moral
economy to particular groups, which blurs the conflictual fields of
thought and action they are part of. Such a problem possibly comes
from the fact that Thompson and Scott themselves spoke,
misleadingly, of ‘the moral economy of the crowd’ and ‘the moral
economy of the peasant’. Yet, as Kofti suggests in this issue, moral
economy can only be associated with an actor if it also designates,
complementarily, the broad field in which such an agent is inscribed.
And even then, locating a particular subject for a moral economy
involves challenges that are very  hard to rise to, such as  ‘the
identification of a social group with a common moral economy’, or
the analysis of ‘people’s individual ideas and practices and their
relation to collective moral frameworks’ (Kofti, this issue).
Second – and partly as a result of circumscribing the concept to
actors and their micro-spheres – the expansion of capitalist markets
and their extremely complex social underpinnings tend to stay
outside of moral economists’ research interests. Moral econom(ies)
are more-often-than-not portrayed as particular realms outside (or in
the cracks of) the market and the state, as reciprocity-systems of
survival linked to particular groups, often unprivileged ones. Thus,
the term becomes associated with the ways in which di erentff  actors
‘re-embed’ their relations in more equal and altruistic modes of social
reproduction, such as religious projects of restoration (Tripp, 2006),
alternative practices around  fair-trade  (Orlando, 2010;  Psarikidou
and Szerszynski, 2012) or unconventional ways of exercising rights
to property (Langegger, 2015). As one can infer, these dominant
approaches treat moral economy as an approximate synonym of
Polanyian embeddedness (Hann, 2010): a heuristic tool to study the
ways in which small-scale economies are more or less embedded in
complex arrays of norms, values and institutions. Some authors
have also deployed the term to reflect on alternative political projects
that might foster higher degrees of solidarity and ‘embedded
sociality’ (Sayer, 2000; Bolton and Laaser, 2013).
In their e ortff  to challenge vulgar economism, moral economists
have ended up avoiding the market and – more specifically – the
pervasive logics of capital as much as embeddedness theorists
(Krippner, 2001). In this sense, a key feature of  this particular
approach to the moral economy concept is the portrayal of norms
and values (sustained by specific communities) as inherently
positive or good vis-à-vis the fragmenting and individualistic nature
of a market without norms. Such an understanding derives from a
mainstream reading of E.P. Thompson’s   1971 essay, pointing to
an analytical and historical distinction: a ‘moral  economy’ period
preceding – and in opposition to – the ‘political economy’ of 19th-
century England; the story of a world defined by moral obligations
and dependences being eroded and replaced by contractual market
relations. Of  course this analysis has long been disputed. The most
popular critique is that   this schema constitutes a highly
dichotomous and evolutionary view of history:   it allegedly
romanticizes past social arrangements vis-à-vis amoral or ‘less
moral’ capitalist formations (Fox-Genovese, 1973; Popkin, 1979;
Booth, 1994; Götz, 2015).
Interestingly, Karl Polanyi’s texts have also been criticized for
allegedly partak- ing in such a binary reading of history. Polanyi is
often thrown into the mix because Thompson’s and Scott’s
arguments partly overlap with that of The Great Transformation.
Though the latter never engaged with the former in their original
work, Polanyi has been sometimes somehow approached as a
moral economist avant la lettre. Hann has even called him ‘the most
sophisticated theoretician of the moral economy writ large’ (2010:
196). As is well-known, in his major work,  the Hungarian author
analyzed the implementation of  laissez-faire doctrines in the 19th
century, contending that they had had a profoundly negative impact
on di erentff  social institutions, mores and customs. In standard
readings, Polanyi is often quoted for having stated that, with the rise
of market society, ‘instead of economy being embedded in social
relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system’
(2001: 77). The common deduction is that Polanyi treats the market
itself as ‘disembedded’.
The inclusion of Polanyi – and of his purportedly dichotomist
approach – in the critique of moral economy is best exemplified by
William James Booth. In his 1994 article, he specifically talks about
the theoretical center of the moral economic approach being the
defining opposition of the embedded economy versus the
disembedded, or autonomous, market. For Booth, the
embedded/disembedded conceptual framework tends to
misconstrue the normative character of modernity: ‘[it] obscures the
character of market society by simultaneously understating the
presence of recognizable and distinct economic behavior in archaic
societies and insisting on too radical a detachment of the modern
economy from its sustaining institutional and normative nexus’
(1994: 662). He argues that even if moral economists warned
against idealizing ‘pre-modern communities’, they could not avoid
doing so: they presented them as realms of solidarity and equality
where individual profit-making and hierarchies were neutralized in
the name of the common good. According to this view, they built
this ideal model and then used it as a mirror to present modern
societies as commodified and dominated by the self- regulating
mechanisms of the market. Against it, he argues that any economy
is su usedff  with the norms of the community of which it is a part, and
that economic relations and values of communities are generally
in a relation of reflective equilibrium.
All economies are moral economies
Most contemporary appropriations of the moral economic approach
have certainly tended to institute this binary thinking, reducing the
sphere of the normative to economies that are generally peripheral
or articulated with an inherently amoral market. In this sense, Booth
(1994) made an important statement in moral economy theory, one
that is necessary to recuperate and emphasize: all economies,
including the market societies of late-capitalism, are moral
economies. However, we argue that in order to do so he partially
misconstrued  the texts  of his predecessors, somehow reducing
them to straw men.
To begin with, the rich descriptions provided by Thompson and
Scott of the English crowd or Burmese peasants are all but a
romantic account of some com- munity-bound world. In di erentff
passages of their work, both authors stress the unequal character of
protectionist social arrangements and interventions. Thompson, for
instance, shows that even when the gentry decided to actually
appeal to the old paternalist laws, law enforcement was selective
and fragmentary and ‘directed almost without exception against
petty culprits, local wide-boys or market-men, who pocketed small
profits on trivial transactions – while the large dealers and millers
were una ected’ff  (1971: 64). Scott, responding to the criticism of
romanticization,  has  more recently  emphasized that  ‘such  forms  of
social insurance had never been practiced as a matter of altruism or
noblesse oblige either by local elites or the state. Instead, they were
a response to the immanent threat of theft, arson, riot, or rebellion
by a hard-pressed peasantry defending its right to survive’ (2005:
397). In fact, he had already warned about this in his original piece:
‘it is all too easy, and a serious mistake, to romanticize these social
arrangements that distinguish much of peasant society. They are
not radically egalitarian. Rather, they imply only that living is
attained often at the cost of a loss of status and autonomy’ (1976:
5). In his account, therefore, social consensus was not based on
disinterested intentions or social justice. Forms of inequality were
not absent, but they were largely tolerated.
More importantly, only if taken at face value can the texts of the
first moral economists be defined as dichotomist. In the 1991 revisit
to his original article, Thompson  clarifies that the  new capitalist
world of the 19th century was not an amoral one. Thompson is well
aware that Adam Smith, who authored The Wealth of Nations – a
‘superb, self-validating essay in logic’ (1971: 91) – is also the thinker
behind The Theory of Moral Sentiments: a treaty ‘grounded in the
liberal moral philosophy of the 18th century enlightenment’ (1991:
271). Although he does not state it explicitly, Thompson is talking
about the shift from a particular moral economy to a new moral
economy (a possibly clearer framework than his confusing
distinction between ‘moral economy’ and ‘political economy’). This
shift is characterized by the development of a series of laissez-faire
policies that attempted to disinfest the market of the kind of moral
imperatives that had hitherto preserved the interests of a social
majority (1991: 89–90): ‘the market economy created new moral
problems [. . .] This was not so much to separate morality and
economics, as to adopt a particular type of morality in the interests
of a particular type of econ- omy’ (1991: 271, quoting Atiyah). And,
one might add, in the interests of certain social classes. Thompson
leaves no doubt: the mere idea of evacuating the market of moral
imperatives was a superstition of those social groups and their
ideologues. Yet this does not contradict the fact that, by destroying a
whole range of protectionist measures and promoting the
commodification of social life on a di erentff  scale, 18th-century
capitalism inaugurated a radically di erentff  moral economy.
A similar reading is applicable to Polanyi’s work, which also
functions on these two levels. Polanyi argues that, with the advent of
industrial economies in the 19th century, capital markets came to
dominate all spheres of social organization. Indeed, he shows how
the proponents of the ‘liberal creed’ (Malthus, Ricardo, Smith and
their subsequent followers) envisioned a world in which the
economy would be disembedded from social institutions and norms.
In fact, they actively worked for this, advocating government policies
that deprived the peasantry of the means and institutions for self-
provision (Perelman, 2000). However, Polanyi clearly underlines that
a disembedded market economy, completely self-regulated, is
impossible: ‘Our thesis is that the idea of a self-regulating market
implied an absolute utopia’ (2000: 18). The expansion of unfettered
markets and their destructive e ectsff  on social institutions generate a
‘double movement’: the more autonomy  markets are given and the
stronger the pressures for commodification (of people, land and
money) are, the bigger the urge for protectionist forms becomes. In
fact,  like Thompson, Polanyi shows in his historical examples the
ways in which di er-ff  ent class fractions (crown, segments of the
aristocracy, artisans, peasants, and workers)  were occasionally
able  to impede  or  at least  restrict  the  play of market forces by
invoking particular moral norms and arrangements and pushing the
state to intervene in di erentff  ways. Market society, as he calls it, is
a political construction, shaped by ‘continuous, centrally organized
and controlled interventionism’ through the state. So-called market
self-regulation is only possible (and to a very limited extent) provided
that the state is aggressively and deeply involved in it. And even then,
economic relations are always embedded in institutions of di erentff
kinds – such as religious or domestic – that are as important as
the central banks that issue currencies or the machines that
increase productivity at the work- place (Block, 2001; Krippner,
2001; Hann and Hart, 2011).
The legacy of the original moral economists, moreover, prompts us
to avoid treating the market as a boundless amoral force that
ultimately commodifies (and destroys)  so-called ‘moral economies’
(characterized by norms and non-instrumental values). It urges us to
see that market processes cannot be set in opposition to extra-
economic cultural and social forces. By the same token, it is
important to bear in mind that stressing the ‘cultural’ or ‘moral’
aspects of market transactions does not imply disregarding the
underlying logics of market transactions them- selves –a tendency
that has produced views of the market that are as ‘disembedded’ as
those of orthodox economists (Krippner, 2001; Krippner et al.,
2004). Briefly put, economic phenomena under capitalism  might
display features (such as the laws of supply and demand) that make
them partly autonomous, but they are at  the same time always
interdependent with systems of meanings, institutions, and
structures of social relations (Zelizer, 1988: 619).
Insights on the problem of ‘value regimes’ (Appadurai, 1988) have
allowed anthropologists  to scrutinize these interdependences.  The
literature on the complex nature of gifts and commodities shows that
the rise of a standard measure of value – represented by market
relations – cannot do away with the constant proliferation of other
forms of value that are simply incommensurable. The question of
why some objects cannot be counted and are considered inalienable
while others change value as they move across di erentff  regimes
underscores a broader debate about the fuzzy boundaries between
morality and market exchange (Gregory, 1982; Munn, 1992; Weiner,
1992; Strathern, 1988; Graeber, 2001). In a similar vein, Valerio
Simoni’s study of Cuban immigrants in crisis-ridden Spain (this
issue) seeks to understand what counts for economic and what
counts for moral for his inform- ants. In order to do so, he brings
into the discussion current debates in moral anthropology (Robbins,
2007; Zigon, 2007, 2014) as well as performativity approaches to
economization (Callon, 2007; C¸ alis¸ kan and Callon, 2009).
Simoni deliberately uses the moral economy concept in a flexible
way since   this gives him the possibility to conceptually navigate
between structural and   ontological analyses. Embeddedness and
economization, he contends,  counterbalance each other. It is in
their interplay that we can find a  productive field of possibilities for
theoretical elaboration. Whereas he   acknowledges the usefulness
of the Thompsonian moral economy concept in highlighting emic
notions of social just- ice, entitlements and moral obligations, Simoni
also rightly urges us to be cautious in adopting abstract analytical
categories such as the economy or the social, par- ticularly when
the ethnographic subjects produce contentious frames to di erenti-ff
ate spheres or sets of values. For example, among several of his
informants, ‘rather than the   economy, what was invested morally
was  the  divide  between  the ‘‘economic’’ and the ‘‘social, between
sentiment and interest and calculation  a divide between two
radically di erentff  spheres of value and modes of being, cast here
as incompatible’.
We completely share Simoni’s view that if we are to understand the
livelihoods of our interlocutors, the least we need to do is to listen to
their ‘competing articulations of moral economic reasoning’. Indeed,
we might add that embeddedness and economization approaches
are not as contradictory as they initially seem, for yet a further
reason. Embeddedness points to the fact that discourses and
valuations always emerge as intertwined with and inseparable from
actual practices of  production, exchange and reproduction. Thus,
Simoni’s fascinating paper begs the question of why certain
interlocutors insist on treating economy and morality as autonomous
fields in spite of their seeming entanglement, and whether this
responds, for instance, to emotions and interests that change
dependent upon their material conjuncture (shifts regarding the
content of their actual relations, their socio-economic trajectory,
etc.). In our view, ‘de-moralizing’ views of the economy are more
often than not a way of moralizing the economy di erently,ff  without
presupposing the actual existence of the latter as a separate realm.
Bringing capital accumulation back in
Acknowledging that all economies are moral economies is crucial to
our under- standing of the market. But it is not enough. In order to
grasp the di erentff  dimensions and qualities of embeddedness it is
crucial to bring capital into the heart of the analysis. In other words,
asking ‘what kind of embeddedness’ implies simultaneously asking
‘what kind of patterns of accumulation’. Paradoxically, analysis of
the macro and micro dynamics of capital, and of the way in which
they inter- twine with norms, social institutions and the state,
remains marginal (if not inexistent), even in rigorous analyses that
directly target reproduction ‘logics’ in order to deconstruct
essentializing cultural explanations (see Olivier de Sardan, 1999). A
notable exception can be found in the recent study of the ‘moral
economy of violence’ in the US, led by Karandinos et al. (2014). In
their rich portrayal of  everyday life in the streets of North
Philadelphia, this team of ethnographers shows how moral
configurations of gift-giving and mutual violence are embedded in
the class relations that make up the drug market. By returning to a
thick usage of  embeddedness, they show how the casual relations of
their street-corner informants  are simultaneously traversed by the
macro logics of capital and the state. The problem with this study,
however, is that its theoretical framework seems unable to fully
break away from the dichotomist perspective, as it builds on the
preconception of two distinct realms: that of the ‘Maussian gift
economy’ and that of ‘primitive accumulation’.
Dimitra Kofti’s analysis of glass-factory workers in Sofia (in this
issue) makes an important step towards bridging these domains.
Kofti frames her analysis as ‘the moral economy of flexible
production’. She builds a multi-dimensional and multi- scalar
understanding of moral economy, using it as an encompassing
approach to phenomena involving various social groups and
collective frames, but also individual ideas and strategies. As she
argues, understanding current inequalities under the regime of
flexible capitalism necessarily means bringing together moral
valuations at the household and at the production line. Like Scott,
she asks: ‘what do people find acceptable and unacceptable, and
what might lead them to take action or what might mute an action?’
For the precarious women working at the cold end, certain kin
obligations, status and gender shifts in the household are morally
prioritized over collegial solidarity on the shop floor. While labor
inequalities are explicitly acknowledged, conjugal family strategies
or gender empowerment linked to labor hinder collective action by
augmenting the fear of layo .ff  Kofti frames her analysis as ‘the
moral economy of flexible production’, based on the entanglement of
two separate economic spheres: the household and the factory. This
approach builds a multi-dimensional and multi-scalar understanding
of the concept. Kofti demonstrates that the intertwining of di erentff
values needs to be taken into account if we are to understand the
current accumulation regime both in terms of continuity and potential
change.
The moral economy approach that we propose here incorporates
and tries to go beyond the debates on market and morality by
recognizing that capital accumulation is structurally inscribed in the
everyday dynamics of social reproduction. Like Zelizer (1988), we
distance ourselves both from the economic absolutism of  the
neoclassical school, but also from culturalist and structurally
reductionist models of the market. In fact, ethnographic cases of
social reproduction in late capitalism tend to show that the increase
of marketization and commodification does not necessarily imply a
decrease in relations marked by a ectff  and moral obligations. The
form that social labor takes, for example, in small family firms and
farms entering an international division of labor as subcontractors in
highly competitive markets is an exemplary case of value
enmeshment (Blim, 1990; Ghezzi, 2003; Narotzky, 2015).
Here,  the question is not  to  evaluate the ways in which abstract
market  principles and logics are articulated with non-market
relations. The micro settings that constitute the standard space of
observation for anthropologists are always permeated with
ambiguous logics, where self-interest, competition, market com-
mensurability and commodification overlap with dependency, norms
and incom- mensurable values (Gregory, 1997; Guyer, 2004;
Gudeman, 2008). Value regimes are intertwined, quite indiscernibly.
In spite of a recurring temptation to frame them according to binary
oppositions, empirical observation reveals that they can be better
understood through the topology of the Moebius strip (Sabel, 1991):
as apparently distinguishable realms that in fact co-exist on the
same plateau, in continuity. It is this very entanglement that
sustains certain patterns of capital accumulation (Narotzky and
Besnier, 2014; Palomera, 2014; Narotzky, 2015). As Susana
Narotzky has argued,  flexible capitalism is based not only on the
opportunistic use of  existing reciprocal relations and moral
obligations for the purpose of capital accumulation but on their
transformation into a new kind of ambivalent reality [.. .] This
overlapping of the  realms of value enables a particular form of
exploitation by capitalist firms and a particular mode of
governmentality that continuously shifts and blurs conflict locations
and obscures knowledge about the localized and globalized
processes of capital accumulation. (2015: 185, 191)
The moral economy approach explores and explains these
ambiguities, taking into account the spatio-temporal conjuncture
and the conditions of possibility that actors encounter in their
pursuit of livelihood.
Capital and class, reproduction and change
Looking at how values, practices and relations are linked to patterns
of accumulation defies the notion of moral economies as stable
frameworks where cultural/ moral values and norms are static. In
light  of this, it is rather surprising  that the main criticism lodged
against the original moral economists is their alleged inability  to
account for social change (Popkin, 1979; Booth, 1994; Wegren,
2005). The works of Thompson, Scott and Polanyi have been
challenged, first, because their analyses purportedly view social
actors as change-resistant subjects, looking to maintain past
arrangements; and, second, because moral economy is supposedly
built in terms of social consensus and equilibrium. ‘The moral
economic approach’, as Booth argues, ‘is, in other words, oriented
toward the static state and is therefore less valuable when the
question is of change across time’ (1994: 658). In order to back
these arguments, repertoires of individual decision-making are
emphasized. Popkin for instance is known for having famously
coined the ideal-type of the ‘rational peasant’ (1980) in order to
underline the ‘investment logic’ and the self- interested calculative
choices of peasants. In his view, the decisions of the latter are
motivated not solely by concerns about protection but also by
incentives for personal gain and future betterment, thus fostering the
unequal stratification of their communities.
Far from these arguments, we contend that moral economy was
originally conceived as a dynamic concept, capable of accounting
for class-informed frameworks of meanings and expectations. The
moral economic approach deals with the complex fields of struggle
in which livelihood projects are involved, always tied to a particular
moment and social structure. The ‘consensus’ that Thompson refers
to does not imply that moral economy is reduced to coercion or habit
and customs. On the contrary, he sees the market and social
reproduction as spaces where class relations are constantly
renegotiated. Consensus or continuity are not about voluntary
agreement or free will, but most often an outcome of social struggle,
which has its winners and losers. As Orlove puts it, moral economy
tries to ‘incorporate culture into analyses of class and political
action’, showing that ‘people struggle not only for wealth and for
power, but also for dignity’ (1997: 260). Beyond the absolute priority
that Adam Smith gives to ‘property rights’ and ‘profit rights’,
Thompson pays attention to the web of ‘entitlements’ and
‘responsibilities’ which constitute the social and political basis of
the economy or the market.  He underlines that ‘conflict over
entitlement to food in the market might be seen as a forum of class
struggle, if most of historians were not too prissy nowadays to use
the term’ (1991: 287). ‘Food prices were not merely one point of
conflict between working and property-owning classes over the
material control of an economy, but were linked to class-specific
notions of social rights and responsibilities’ (1991: 259). There is little
basis therefore for arguing that the riots described by Thompson
were nostalgic movements to restore ‘traditional systems’. Rather,
we agree with Edelman that they were future-oriented (2005),  as
they partook in the historical strife among hierarchically-positioned
social groups to define entitlements and rights, forms of social
responsibility and obligation, tolerable levels of exploitation and
inequality, meanings of dignity and justice. For Thompson, the
‘market economy’ is nothing else than a metaphor (or mask) for
capitalist process, worn by particular interests. The ‘market’ is ‘a
mystifying metaphor for the energies released and the new needs (and
choices) opened up by capitalist forms of exchanges, with  all
conflicts and contradictions withdrawn from view’ (1991: 305).
Therefore, moral economy is dynamic by definition, and
reproduction or change depends on the particular interface among
shifts in capital accumulation patterns, mentalities (or borrowing
Bourdieu’s term, dispositions) and relations between class fractions.
Thompson describes an old redistributive paternalist arrangement
that did not simply depend on the altruism of the elites: it was ‘a
calculative stance in the culturally constructed alliance between
patricians and the plebs against the middling orders, and it
distracted attention from the landowners’ prosperity to point to
prominent Dissenters and Quakers among the profiteering food
dealers’ (1991: 301). The state, with its multi-layered agents, played
a protagonist role as well in these struggles and alliances, as it did in
the transition to capitalism, particularly after the civil wars and the
spread of anti-Jacobinism. The new definition of ‘common weal’
shifted the solidarities and allegiances of the rulers, from the
commoners to capital owners. Moral duties regarding the
redistribution of wealth were increasingly redesigned as charity and
hitherto legitimate claims to price- fixing became attacks on
property. All of this occurred at a time when the industrial revolution
was unfolding, and laboring people’s demands increasingly shifted from
market regulation (exchange of goods and money) to the rise of
wages (labor) and the end of Speenhamland (Thompson, 1991).
Furthermore, Thompson’s particular approach to class sets the
moral economic approach apart from the embeddedness thesis.
Polanyi is very sensitive to the class conflict underlying the epochal
change he describes in The Great Transformation. For him, the role
of the state as a coercing force plays a central role (Lie, 1991;
Block, 2003; Bolton and Laaser, 2013). However, as Burawoy
(2003) has observed, Polanyi operates with an old-fashioned class
concept that assumes a working-class community is formed only in
the light of external threats and has no independent consciousness.
The latter describes how commodification led to the destruction of
social institutions, but is unable to explain what led to the
formation of class interests and mobilization in such a context of
disorganization. Conversely, E.P. Thompson gives preeminence to
people’s agency. He valorizes the ongoing ethical evaluations of people
during di erentff  periods of change, and shows the importance  of
working-class traditions for class formation: their cultural, political
and economic resources. Thompson shows that the working-class
mobilization that crystallized in the context of industrialization ‘was
forged not from anomie and desperation but from the
organizational legacies of proto-industrialization of the North [. . .]
The English working class could not be regarded as a blank slate,
defenseless against market forces. It was already embedded in
community, which gave it the weapons to defend itself and advance
active society in its own name’ (Burawoy, 2003: 222).
Moral economy and hegemony
Since the seminal works of Thompson and Scott, moral economists
attentive to capital and class have been drawn to mobilizations that
defy the established order and appeal to di erentff  moral values. A
salient example is the work of Edelman, who has focused on how
transnational networks of peasant movements mobilize against
supranational institutions (2005). In particular, he looks at how
projects of ‘food sovereignty’ are linked to moral claims regarding
the right of those working the land to a fair and secure livelihood.
However, in confining the analysis to the claims of mobilized
peasants, Edelman paints a partial picture of the moral economic
field they are inscribed in, disregarding other (conflicting) values and
practices that might help us understand the limits around them.
Hence the question: since capital accumulation is metabolized
through complex and contradictory fields of norms, meanings and
practices, should we restrict the notion of moral economy only to
actors seeking to alter it? Edelman’s warning against emptying the
concept of ‘class content’ (2012: 63) remains paramount, but the
approach to class needs to be broader, including dynamics that do
not necessarily correspond with political subject formation or
organized conflict. Circumscribing the concept of moral economy to
actors defending class struggle or leftist causes might prevent us
from analyzing elements that explain, for instance, why people do
not mobilize. Or why they do so, but according to reasons that are
far removed from promoting social justice or the interests of
minorities. As Hann (2010) has remarked, moral economy is not
only about taking into account the values and norms that might lead
to political action against the dominant powers or ideology but also
those that might underpin positive visions of private property, the
institutions of the market or racism, and that might be invoked to
legitimate actions too. As he succinctly puts it: ‘if moral economy is
primarily a nexus of beliefs, practices and emotions among the folk,
rather than an analytic concept designed to register only those
beliefs, practices and emotions which conduce to action which the
observer considers to be progressive, then we must conclude that
even the reactionary right is entitled to its moral economy’ (Hann,
2010:  195). In other words, while Edelman seems to equate the
notion of moral economy with consciously organized class conflict
(between rulers and ruled), Hann hints at  a conceptualization that
understands class dispositions and practices more broadly. In his text,
Hann suggests that not even Thompson himself could get out of the
normative approach characteristic in moral economists, particularly
as he had trouble dealing with the fact that English workers were
imbued with nationalist sentiments. Yet we think that Thompson’s
work o ersff  an example of how di er-ff  ences in Edelman’s and
Hann’s visions of class can be bridged. His opera magna on the
historical formation of the English working class is precisely a
demonstration of the many contentious moral views (many of which
did not coincide with his own) and lines of fracture traversing the
social worlds of the di erentff  people that would eventually emerge
as a political subject (1991 [1963]).
The debate around class also points to a terrain for the most part
avoided, which has to do with the reproduction of power. There is
a crossroads at which the concept of moral economy and that of
hegemony inevitably meet, though recent scholarship on moral
economy has not explored how. In recent years hegemony has
become like the elephant in the room: while moral economists pay
close atten- tion to some of the situated micro-mechanisms that
reproduce (or alter) power structures at large, they generally avoid
engaging with hegemony theories. This is a striking gap since both
Thompson (1971) and Scott (1985, 1990) deal with the concept,
mainly to disagree with the idea that hegemony entails
uncontested acceptance by the poor of their domination.
In that sense, Dimitrios Gkintidis’s refreshing look at the moral
economy of  European integration with regard to Greece and its
articulation with the notion of hegemony is a very welcome exception.
His study shows how di erentlyff  positioned actors in the institutional
structure of EU aid persistently frame the latter in terms of gifts and
obligations, at the expense of other interpretations that could
highlight structural inequalities. By recognizing the European Union
as an abstract origin- ator of past solidarity gestures towards Greeks,
technocrats  justify today’s austerity measures as ‘reciprocal
obligations’. From Gkintidis’ point of view, this top-down moralization
of relations between states and peoples legitimizes growing class
inequalities and the reproduction of capitalist logics and practices.
His elaboration brings together Fassin’s ideas about the current
moralization of politics and a Gramscian conception of hegemony
as the cultural domination, by particular elites, of social formations.
He concludes that hegemonic processes are sustained as long as
the dominated adopt the explanatory frameworks of the dominant
(in this case the solidary character of the EU). An important
question to be answered is why and how this happens. Is it through
the manipulation of cultural values and mores that elites can exert
domination on the rest of society, justifying inequality as a natural
and inevitable state of a airs?ff  Gkintidis seems to respond
a rmatively:ffi  by drawing a sharp line between structural and moral
understand- ings, his conceptual apparatus assumes the existence
of a realm or set of material structures that need to be distinguished
from (and somewhat stripped of) their moral superstructure, so to
speak.
According to this view, the moral seems to operate as an ideological
shroud that legitimizes unequal outcomes. This stems partly from
the fact that Gkintidis’ empirical work looks  specifically at the
upper echelons  of a supranational  state institution. Building on
this, it would be illuminating to complement this analysis with
ethnographies of how non-elites – i.e. social majorities currently
experiencing EU-led austerity cuts – relate to the same meanings
and values. For instance, an analysis along the lines of Raymond
Williams (1980) could suggest that such meanings and values are
not only abstract but also organized and lived; that hegemony can
be understood at the level of ideological manipulation or inter- est
misrecognition but also as cultural domination that takes shape in
everyday practices and expectations, thus constituting a particular
sense of reality for most people. After all, as Williams remarked, if
institutions simply conveyed the mean- ings and valuations of the
elites, or of a section of the elites, and imposed them on the rest of
society, then the dominant culture would be very easy to overthrow
(1980: 38). Such an argument underscores the fact that the
economic and the moral are deeply intertwined in other words, both
are, in fact, structural.
Furthermore, the moral economic approach highlights the often-
contradictory values that guide and sustain livelihood practices, thus
preserving anthropologists against the temptation to pigeonhole their
interlocutors in predefined ideological frameworks. As Thompson
suggested, while moral economy ‘cannot be described as ‘‘political’’
in any advanced sense, nevertheless it cannot be described as
unpolitical either, since it suppose[s] definite and passionately
held notions of the common weal’ (1971: 79). This implies
accounting for alternative meanings and values that are more or less
accommodated within the dominant culture; practices and views that
might legitimize dominant ones without fully endorsing them. In fact,
class accommodation and hegemony might occur because of the
constrained ways inequalities are embedded in mundane processes
of reproduction and moral dependences that often do not leave
much space for maneuver. These might as well be consciously
recognized as such (see Kofti, this issue) without necessarily
indicating a path to change.
Conclusion
Engaging with moral economy is not meant to revive a theoretical
debate simply for the sake of theory. This paper seeks to both
underline anthropology’s capacity for holistic analysis and radical
critique, and to respond to the intellectual urgency of the current
historical moment. Our aim is therefore twofold. First, in the face of a
bourgeoning anthropology of morals, we want to bring political
economy to the center of anthropological analysis. In our
understanding, moral economy is not political economy’s ‘other’: it is
not its historical antecedent in evolutionary terms; nor is it simply
another scale of analysis. Moral economy is precisely the
anthropological way to study the political economy. It deals since its
inception with the practices, meanings and institutions that regulate
social formations in a world increasingly dominated by the principles
of capital accumulation. It is not therefore a synonym of the – often
positively charged ‘solidarity economies’ functioning outside the
market, or in its interstices (informal economy). Neither can it be
deployed to simply account for micro-economic practices, such as
networks of reciprocity and obligation that often cushion exploitation
and crisis e ects,ff  without linking them to power relations at large.
Moral economy, above all, is about understanding the inner
workings of capitalism and the qualities of social reproduction at
particular historical times and spaces. It is an approach that
advocates an anthropological understanding of class (Wolf, 1982;
Kalb, 1998; Narotzky and Smith,  2006;  Carrier and  Kalb, 2015),
bringing under the same analytical frame- work di erentff  regimes of
value and pointing to the complex ways they are entangled.
Second, we contend that this theoretical exercise is a timely
anthropological task. Moral economy seems particularly suited to
interpret moments of historical rupture, where tensions between
analytical dimensions such as between the moral frameworks and
the logics of accumulation are exacerbated. In this issue, we are
putting together in essays and in dialogue fresh anthropological
accounts of crisis-ridden Europe. All papers deploy the concept of
moral economy in order to make sense of and explain current
processes of structural dispossession, such as the flexibilization of
labor, the institutional architecture of the European Union and
migration or transitions between political-economic regimes. Albeit in
quite di erentff  ways, the authors seek to understand the everyday-
grounded logics of macro-economic  (and political) processes by
bringing together structural proper-  ties and peoples’ moral
dispositions. After all, moral economy is all about tracing the multi-
scalar logics of power (Wolf, 1990), and power always involves
struggle. Only by reading these two realms together can we
understand current social mobilizations and silences, hegemony and
counter-hegemony, continuity and change, or the mere conditions of
possibility for them.
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Note
1. This paper is a theorization on moral economy that re-assesses
the existing literature while providing an introductory framework to
the new special issue of Anthropological Theory, devoted to this
question. The journal’s new number features a series of articles that
were  originally  presented  at  a  panel  of  the  ASA  (Association
of  Social Anthropologists of the UK and Commonwealth) decennial
conference in Edinburgh, June 2014. The chosen title, ‘Moral
Economy in Crisis’, reflects two aspects of the discussion at stake.
First, it highlights the analyses of Gkintidis, Kofti and Simoni (this
issue) that stem from research among social groups which have
been impacted by  the ongoing European crisis, in one way or
another. Second, and most importantly, the title of this special issue
conveys a collective desire to problematize the notion of moral
economy and put its conceptual relevance to test.
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